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ESSAY

JURISDICTION AND JUDICIAL SELF-DEFENSE

S. CAGLE JUHAN† & GREG RUSTICO‡
INTRODUCTION
Recently, much of the legal community has been captivated by the rapid
developments in State of Washington v. Trump,1 the case challenging the
legality of President Trump’s Executive Order 13,769 (“the Immigration
Order”). Among other provisions, the Immigration Order temporarily
suspended the refugee admissions program, blocked the entry of persons
from designated Middle Eastern countries, and indefinitely suspended entry
of Syrian nationals.2
A number of suits were brought challenging the legality of the action,
including one by the State of Washington, which Minnesota later joined.3 In
the ten days following Washington’s filing suit to enjoin the Immigration
Order, District Judge James Robart issued a nationwide temporary
restraining order (“TRO”) against it,4 the Government sought an emergency
stay on appeal,5 and the Ninth Circuit handed down a twenty-nine page

† J.D., University of Virginia School of Law; B.A. with distinction, University of Virginia.
‡ J.D., University of Virginia School of Law; M.Ed., B.A., University of Notre Dame.
1 No. C17-0141, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017), motion for stay pending appeal
denied, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).
2 Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 8977-79 (Jan. 27, 2017).
3 See Scott Malone & Dan Levine, Challenges to Trump’s Immigration Orders Spread to More U.S. States,
REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-immigration-sanfranciscoidUSKBN15F2B1 [https://perma.cc/3J6Q-X56K] (detailing the states that had challenged President
Trump’s Immigration Order as of February 1st, 2017).
4 Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017)
[hereinafter Judge Robart’s Order].
5 Emergency Motion Under Circuit Rule 27-3 for Administrative Stay and Motion for Stay
Pending Appeal at 8, Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-35105) [hereinafter
Government Appeal Brief].
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precedential opinion refusing to grant a stay.6 This breakneck pace has
generated significant commentary on the underlying legal disputes and, to a
lesser extent, of the States’ standing to sue.7
In our view, an interesting aspect of the case is flying largely under the
radar: appellate jurisdiction. We find this issue notable for two, interrelated
reasons. First, the parties and the Ninth Circuit devoted almost no attention
to the matter, despite the question being a close one doctrinally. This presages
our second point of intrigue, one of judicial policy and craftsmanship: Why
bother exercising jurisdiction at all?
Recall the procedural posture of the case. The Government sought an
emergency stay of the TRO, arguing that it was actually a preliminary
injunction (“PI”).8 A PI—unlike a TRO—is appealable.9 But instead of
concluding that the order was a TRO, and thus not subject to appeal, the
Ninth Circuit construed the order as a PI, reached the merits, and denied the
Government’s motion for an emergency stay, leaving the district court order
in place.10 The Ninth Circuit could have achieved functionally the same
result—leaving the district court’s order in place—by concluding, as one
reasonably could, that the district court order was in fact a TRO and the
Ninth Circuit lacked appellate jurisdiction altogether.11 The preceding
discussion thus begs the question: Why did the Ninth Circuit reach the merits
of the case when it had narrower grounds to achieve the same ends?
We surmise that the Ninth Circuit’s decision to exercise jurisdiction and
reach the merits was an act of judicial self-defense. Washington v. Trump, by
6 Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Appellate Opinion].
7 See, e.g., Jonathan Hafetz, Why Courts Appear Willing to Reject Trump’s Travel Ban Order, JUST
SECURITY (Feb. 6, 2017, 10:41 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/37388/courts-reject-trumps-travel-

ban-order/ [https://perma.cc/9UVJ-W8QU] (one paragraph of analysis on States’ standing, five on
the merits); Emma Kohse, Washington v. Trump: Summary of Ninth Circuit Decision Upholding TRO in
Trump Travel Ban Case, LAWFARE (Feb. 9, 2017, 8:52 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
washington-v-trump-summary-ninth-circuit-decision-upholding-tro-trump-travel-ban-case [https://
perma.cc/5LJN-XRDL] (containing two sentences on standing in 1,000-plus word summary of
opinion); Marty Lederman, Getting a Handle on the Litigation Challenging the Seven-Nation “Travel
Ban”, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 6, 2017, 6:00 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/37315/getting-handlelitigation-challenging-seven-nation-travel-ban/ [https://perma.cc/9LSX-GAEB] (mentioning standing
only in passing and observing it “is very difficult to keep track, in anything approaching real time,
of the various arguments by all parties and the government”); Michael McConnell, A Flawed
Restraining of a Flawed Order, HOOVER INST. (Feb. 10, 2017), http://www.hoover.org/research/
flawed-restraining-flawed-order [https://perma.cc/SY6S-D9XA] (providing modest analysis of standing).
8 Government Appeal Brief, supra note 5, at 8.
9 See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
10 See infra note 18–19 and accompanying text.
11 By “functionally the same result” we mean that the Immigration Order would have
remained enjoined regardless. Had the court declined to exercise jurisdiction, the TRO would have
continued in place until a PI decision was made, at which point the Government could have appealed
if a PI was granted.
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the Ninth Circuit’s own admission, presents “extraordinary” and “unusual”
circumstances.12 Those circumstances include a pattern of extrajudicial
statements by the President questioning not only the reasoning, but also the
legitimacy, of judicial decisions and the judges who issue them.13 By reaching
the merits and preliminarily upholding the district court’s ruling—rather
than finding that it lacked jurisdiction—the Ninth Circuit chose to send a
clear (and unanimous) signal that it stands behind Judge Robart’s (and all
judges) authority in our constitutional scheme.
I. TROS, PIS, AND LIMITS ON APPELLATE JURISDICTION
A. Appellate Jurisdiction over TROs and PIs, Generally
The United States Code establishes that “the courts of appeals shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from . . . [i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts
of the United States . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or
dissolving injunctions.”14 It is well established that this grant of jurisdiction
excludes TROs.15 Nevertheless, a district court cannot simply “shield its
orders from appellate review merely by designating them as temporary
restraining orders.”16 Appellate courts will look to “the essence of the order,
not its moniker,” to determine whether they have jurisdiction.17
In Washington v. Trump, the Ninth Circuit panel did precisely that,
concluding in two brief paragraphs that it had jurisdiction.18 While
acknowledging that TROs are not usually appealable, the panel reasoned that
the instant TRO “possess[ed] the qualities” of a PI because the parties
“vigorously contested the legal basis for the TRO in written briefs and oral
arguments,” the TRO had no expiration date, and no PI hearing had been
scheduled at that time.19
We posit that several factors—the accelerated timeline of the case, the
minimal oral argument before the district judge, the sparse reasoning of the
district court order, and the district court’s scheduling order—reveal that this
12
13
14
15

Appellate Decision, 847 F.3d at 1158.
See infra Sections II.A–B.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (2012).
See, e.g., Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Ordinarily,
temporary restraining orders, in contrast to preliminary injunctions, are not appealable . . . .”); see
also Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 86-88 (1974) (recognizing that a TRO typically falls outside
appellate review, but concluding that “where an adversary hearing has been held, and the court’s
basis for issuing the order strongly challenged, classification of the potentially unlimited order as a
temporary restraining order seems particularly unjustified”).
16 Sampson, 415 U.S. at 87.
17 Bennett, 285 F.3d at 804.
18 Appellate Opinion, 847 F.3d at 1158.
19 Id.
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jurisdictional question was much closer than the panel (or the parties)
averred.20 Given these factors and the broad latitude appellate courts possess
when deciding whether district court orders are TROs or PIs, the Ninth Circuit
panel easily could have concluded that Judge Robart’s order was a TRO and
thus beyond its jurisdiction. While we do not contend the panel’s decision was
necessarily incorrect,21 the panel did reject a colorable and narrower alternative
ground for decision that would have yielded functionally the same result.
B. Appellate Jurisdiction in Washington v. Trump
To better understand the distinction between TROs and PIs, one must
briefly consider the nature of TROs. Professors Wright and Miller explain
that TROs are “designed to preserve the status quo until there is an
opportunity to hold a hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction
and may be issued with or without notice to the adverse party.”22 Unlike PIs,
which typically remain in effect during the pendency of a case,23 TROs are
limited in scope, lasting a maximum of fourteen days unless extended for
good cause or by consent of the adverse party.24 TROs must possess the same
basic contents of PIs.25 Moreover, when considering motions seeking TROs,
courts use the same factors as for PIs,26 though their analysis is typically

20 Although the issue of jurisdiction was raised by the States in their brief, they devoted a
mere two paragraphs to the issue. States’ Response to Emergency Motion Under Circuit Rule 27-3
for Administrative Stay and Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at 5-6, Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d
1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-35105) [hereinafter States’ Response Brief]. The discussion was in
response to the Government’s initial brief, which contained just one paragraph on the subject.
Government Appeal Brief, supra note 5, at 8. The Government did not even mention jurisdiction in
their reply brief. Reply in Support of Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, Washington v.
Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-35105). Similarly, neither party has addressed appellate
jurisdiction during the subsequent briefing over whether to rehear the case en banc. See States’ Brief
Regarding Rehearing En Banc, Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 2017);
Supplemental Brief on En Banc Consideration, Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb 16, 2017).
21 But see Josh Blackman, The Ninth Circuit’s Contrived Comedy of Errors in Washington v. Trump:
Part I, LAWFARE (Feb. 13, 2017, 4:18 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ninth-circuits-contrivedcomedy-errors-washington-v-trump-part-I [https://perma.cc/FC9E-CNCR?type=image] (arguing
that the Ninth Circuit obviously lacked appellate jurisdiction).
22 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2951 (3d
ed. 2017) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
23 See id. § 2947 (“[T]he purpose [of a PI] is not to determine any controverted right, but to
prevent a threatened wrong or any further perpetration of injury, or the doing of any act pending
the final determination of the action . . . .” (quoting Benson Hotel Corp. v. Woods, 168 F.2d 694,
696 (8th Cir. 1948))).
24 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(2) (2009).
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d).
26 See, e.g., Judge Robart’s Order, 2017 WL 462040, at *1 (“The standard for issuing a TRO is
the same as the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction.” (citing New Motor Vehicle Bd. v.
Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977))).
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condensed due to the time-sensitive nature of TRO requests.27 This captures
the essence of why TROs are not appealable: They are temporary orders that
endure only long enough for a proper preliminary injunction motion to be
considered and decided.
Despite the general principle that TROs are not appealable, courts of
appeals sometimes construe TROs as PIs and thus exercise appellate
jurisdiction over them. Although “[t]here is no precise test for determining
whether an order will be deemed a preliminary injunction for purposes of
appeal,”28 courts weigh factors such as: (1) whether the TRO exceeds the time
limits in Rule 65(b)(2);29 (2) whether a subsequent PI hearing has been
scheduled;30 and (3) whether the opposing party had sufficient notice, along
with an opportunity to be heard and present evidence in a hearing seeking a
TRO.31 In essence, courts consider whether a given order functions more like
a PI than a TRO, irrespective of its label.32
A brief review of Judge Robart’s order reveals that, in most respects, it
possessed the qualities of a standard TRO. First, Judge Robart reached his
decision and published his order with remarkable speed. Washington filed its
complaint on January 30, 2017,33 and subsequently amended it on February 1,
2017, to add Minnesota.34 The Government appeared and filed a brief
opposing the States’ request for a TRO on February 2, 2017,35 and Judge
Robart held a one-hour hearing on February 3, 2017—at which no evidence

27 See, e.g., Providence Health & Servs. v. McLaughlin, No. C17-24, 2017 WL 68426, at *2
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 6, 2017) (providing four short paragraphs on TRO analysis); Does v. Univ. of
Wash., No. C16-1212, 2016 WL 4147307, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 3, 2016) (Robart, J.) (analyzing the
TRO factors in one paragraph).
28 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2962.
29 Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 86 (1974); Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v. Nat’l Union of
Healthcare Workers, 598 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2010); Chi. United Indus., Ltd. v. City of Chicago,
445 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2006); Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 2002). But
see Grant v. United States, 282 F.2d 165, 168-70 (2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly, J.) (refusing to accept
jurisdiction over a TRO that had extended four days beyond the time limit).
30 Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426, 430 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Serv. Emps., 598 F.3d
at 1066 (noting that a PI—which requires a hearing—had been requested and issued).
31 Serv. Emps., 598 F.3d at 1067; Bennett, 285 F.3d at 804; Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d 226,
229 (5th Cir. 1965). But see Bailey v. Transp.-Commc’n Emps. Union, 45 F.R.D. 444, 445 (N.D.
Miss. 1968) (finding that defendant’s presence at an initial hearing was insufficient to convert a TRO
to a PI because two days of notice was insufficient).
32 See Bennett, 285 F.3d at 804 (“It is the essence of the order, not its moniker, that determines
our jurisdiction.”).
33 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2017).
34 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Washington v. Trump,
No. C17-0141 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 1, 2017).
35 Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff State of Washington’s Motion for TRO, Washington
v. Trump, No. C17-0141 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 2, 2017).
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was presented.36 Judge Robart then issued an oral order from the bench,37 and
a written order was entered that same day.38 This expedited timeline is more
characteristic of a TRO than a PI.39
Second, although Judge Robart’s order did not contain an explicit
expiration date, he ordered the parties to propose a PI briefing schedule by
the next business day, February 6, 2017.40 This implies that Judge Robart
viewed his order as a temporary measure to maintain the status quo until a
PI hearing could be held. As discussed, this is precisely the purpose of TROs.41
Third, Judge Robart’s order contains only two paragraphs analyzing the
legal standards for injunctive relief, the brevity one would expect in a TRO.
For instance, Judge Robart writes summarily,
The States have satisfied the Winter test because they have shown that they
are likely to succeed on the merits of the claims that would entitle them to
relief; the States are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief; the balance of the equities favor the States; and a TRO is
in the public interest.42

The order provides no analysis of how the States satisfied that burden.
Such conclusory language is common for TROs,43 but it would be considered
unacceptable for a PI.44
These factors, when viewed together, demonstrate that not only did Judge
Robart believe his order was a TRO, but also that the Ninth Circuit could
have reasonably reached the same conclusion. Instead, the Ninth Circuit
panel construed the order as a PI. As justification for this decision, the panel
noted that (1) the parties “vigorously contested” the TRO, and (2) the order
had no expiration date or hearing scheduled.45
But to say that the TRO was “vigorously contested” is something of a
misnomer: While the parties vehemently disagreed as to the legality of the
Immigration Order, among other issues, the opportunity to fully develop

36 Oral Argument, Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017),
http://www.uscourts.gov/cameras-courts/state-washington-vs-donald-j-trump-et-al [https://perma.cc/S7ELEACN].
37 Id. at 56:00.
38 Judge Robart’s Order, No. C17-0141, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017).
39 Compare WRIGHT & MILLER § 2951 (discussing the purpose and usual characteristics of a
TRO), with id. § 2947 (describing the purpose and characteristics of a PI).
40 2017 WL 462040, at *3.
41 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
42 2017 WL 462040, at *2.
43 See supra note 27.
44 See, e.g., Am. Passage Media Corp. v. Cass Commc’ns, Inc., 750 F.2d 1470, 1472-73 (9th Cir.
1985) (reversing a district court’s PI for insufficient findings of fact).
45 Appellate Opinion, 847 F.3d 1151, 1158 (9th Cir. 2017).
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their positions was quite constrained. Judge Robart granted the TRO a mere
four days after the initial complaint was filed and only two days after it was
amended.46 Due to the short timeframe, each side submitted just one brief to
Judge Robart,47 and no evidence was entered into the record during oral
argument.48 In contrast, the parties in both Bennett and Service Employees—the
cases cited by the Ninth Circuit panel to support its conclusion that the order
should be construed as a PI—had filed “extensive written materials,” and in
Service Employees, a two-day evidentiary hearing had been held.49 In other words,
bare notice and a hearing alone are not always sufficient to construe a TRO as a
PI.50 In fact, holding an adversarial hearing before issuing a TRO is encouraged.51
Similarly, the absence of an expiration date in Judge Robart’s order did not
necessarily render it appealable. The TRO asked the parties to propose a
schedule for briefing the PI, and a subsequent scheduling order (entered before
the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion) adopted the parties’ briefing schedule.52
The scheduling order required the final PI briefs to be filed by February 17,
2017, exactly fourteen days from the issuance of the TRO.53 This meant that the
TRO would extend briefly beyond the time limit set out in Rule 65(b)(2).54
Nevertheless, the rule allows a TRO to be extended if “the adverse party
consents,”55 and courts have recognized that consent to a briefing schedule
qualifies as consent to a TRO extension.56 By contrast, the cases cited by the
Ninth Circuit panel involved TROs that unambiguously violated the timing
rules of Rule 65(b)(2). In Bennett, the TRO deadline was three times longer

46
47
48

See supra notes 33, 34, and 37.
See supra notes 34–35.
In fact, the Government’s attorney spoke for a grand total of twenty-six minutes at the
hearing. Oral Argument, supra note 36, at 25:00.
49 Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v. Nat’l Union of Healthcare Workers, 598 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir.
2010); Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d
226, 229 (5th Cir. 1965) (construing a TRO as a PI after a full evidentiary hearing was held with witnesses).
50 See, e.g., Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1964) (finding that notice and a
brief hearing on a TRO did not affect its appealability because parties did not view the order as a PI).
51 FED. R. CIV. P. 65 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (instructing that
“opposition should be heard, if feasible,” before a TRO is granted).
52 Order on Briefing Schedule for Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction,
Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141 (W.D. Wash. filed Feb. 7, 2017).
53 Id.
54 Cf. Grant v. United States, 282 F.2d 165, 168 (2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly, J.) (refusing to
construe a TRO as a PI when it extended four days beyond the time limit).
55 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(2); see also Ross v. Evans, 325 F.2d 160, 160-61 (5th Cir. 1963) (per
curiam) (finding that a TRO extended by consent cannot be appealed).
56 See, e.g., Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426, 430 (11th Cir. 1982) (declining appellate
jurisdiction where the government impliedly consented to an extension of a TRO).
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than permitted by Rule 65(b)(2),57 and in Service Employees, the TRO required
compliance pending the resolution of a PI motion, which had not been filed.58
Therefore, despite the parties’ and the panel’s terse discussion of appellate
jurisdiction in Washington v. Trump, the issue was a close one. Considering
the rapid timeline, minimal oral argument in the district court, limited
analysis in the Judge Robart’s order, and existence of a scheduling order, the
Ninth Circuit panel could have reasonably held that Judge Robart’s order was
in fact a TRO and could not be appealed. Because such a finding would have
yielded the same outcome in the case—leaving Judge Robart’s order in place
and the Immigration Order enjoined—a claim that the judges were simply
seeking a particular outcome does not explain the decision to exercise
jurisdiction. If the panel was simply determined to block the Immigration
Order, a question remains: Why did it choose the merits path over the
jurisdictional one if the destination was the same?
II. JUDICIAL SELF-DEFENSE
The Ninth Circuit panel’s decision to exercise jurisdiction is particularly
puzzling because it required the panel to wade into a high-profile case
challenging the authority of a newly elected President in an area of
traditionally robust executive power. In so doing, the panel eschewed “passive
virtues”59 and the “time-honored tradition of avoiding constitutional
questions where narrower grounds are available.”60
57
58
59

Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 2002).
Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v. Nat’l Union of Healthcare Workers, 598 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2010).
See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961) (arguing that the Supreme Court should proceed incrementally
and, in certain circumstances, decide cases on narrower grounds rather than on the merits); see also
Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Balance Between Judicial Minimalism and
Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1755, 1771-72 (2004) (discussing modern scholars who have
built on Professor Bickel’s work and arguing that “[b]y embracing the ‘passive virtues’—employing
prudential justiciability doctrines, the discretionary certiorari power, and other tools to postpone or
avoid resolving disputes that are not ready for resolution—the Supreme Court could avoid
displacing political decisionmaking and instead exert a valuable influence over democratic
deliberation and debate”); Adrian Vermeule, Second Opinions and Institutional Design, 97 VA. L. REV.
1435, 1440 (2011) (“By construing statutes narrowly to avoid constitutional questions, by invalidating
statutes on procedural rather than substantive grounds, and through other exercises of ‘the passive
virtues,’ Bickel thought that courts could encourage or force legislatures to squarely face and
deliberate on constitutional objections to their enactments.” (footnote omitted)).
60 Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 808 n.14 (9th Cir. 2003); see also
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (detailing
situations in which the Court should avoid passing upon constitutional questions and instead decide cases
on narrower grounds); Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 931 n.5 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing the “canon
of constitutional avoidance, which requires a statute to be construed so as to avoid serious doubts as to the
constitutionality of an alternate construction”); Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 843 (9th
Cir. 2003) (“[W]e avoid considering constitutionality if an issue may be resolved on narrower grounds . . . .”).
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We infer that the Ninth Circuit panel saw that maneuver not as a defect,
but as a central feature of its opinion. Apart from doctrinaire legal analysis, the
panel’s decision to reach the merits is an expression of institutional self-defense
against efforts to erode the judiciary’s legitimacy. By choosing the path it did,
the panel signaled its support for not only Judge Robart’s conclusions, but
also for his (and theirs, and other judges’) authority and willingness to serve
as a check on the Executive. The panel’s decision is perhaps best explained by
Justice Holmes’s maxim that “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”61
A. Comments About U.S. District Judge Curiel During the 2016
Presidential Campaign
During the 2016 presidential race, then-candidate Trump injected the
impartiality and competence of judges into the campaign. He opined that
U.S. District Judge Gonzalo Curiel, who was presiding over fraud lawsuits
against the defunct Trump University, could not objectively decide the cases.
Specifically, Trump stated that Judge Curiel’s “Mexican heritage” presented
an “absolute” and “inherent conflict of interest” due to Trump’s campaign
promise to build a wall on the Mexican–American border.62 He labeled Judge
Curiel “a total disgrace” and “a hater,” suggested authorities “ought to look
into” the judge, and claimed the courts were “a rigged system.”63 On Twitter,
Trump called Judge Curiel “very biased and unfair.”64
Legal experts and commentators decried Trump’s comments as
inappropriate, overt attacks on judicial independence, which could lessen
courts’ ability to check Executive power.65 In a subsequent order, even Judge
61
62

N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
Brent Kendall, Trump Says Judge’s Mexican Heritage Presents “Absolute Conflict”, WALL ST. J.
(June 3, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-keeps-up-attacks-on-judge-gonzalocuriel-1464911442 [https://perma.cc/337P-3G2K].
63 Peter Beinart, Trump Takes Aim at the Independent Judiciary, ATLANTIC (June 1, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/the-gop-front-runner-takes-aim-at-theindependent-judiciary/485087/ [https://perma.cc/UJ2Y-5ZME]; Kendall, supra note 62; Adam
Liptak, Donald Trump Could Threaten U.S. Rule of Law, Scholars Say, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/04/us/politics/donald-trump-constitution-power.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/A483-T2AK].
64 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 2, 2016, 9:54 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/738413456118841345 [https://perma.cc/6G82-QR4R];
accord Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 30, 2016, 2:45 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/737399475509985280?lang=en [https://perma.cc/NA6C5T68] (“I have a judge in the Trump University civil case, Gonzalo Curiel (San Diego), who is very
unfair. An Obama pick. Totally biased—hates Trump[.]”).
65 Beinart, supra note 63; Kendall, supra note 62; Liptak, supra note 63; Shushannah Walshe
& Meghan Keneally, Legal Experts Worry After Trump Attacks Judge for Alleged Bias, Judge’s Brother
Calls Trump a “Blowhard”, ABC NEWS (June 3, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/legal-expertsworry-trump-attacks-judge-alleged-bias/story?id=39589590 [https://perma.cc/5HPH-BY6Y].
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Curiel acknowledged the effects of the comments, observing that Trump had
“placed the integrity of these court proceedings at issue.”66
B. Comments About Judge Robart and the Washington v. Trump Litigation
Appointed by President George W. Bush and unanimously confirmed by
the Senate, Judge Robart is a widely respected judge.67 Attorneys and
politicians describe him as a “judge’s judge” with “exceptional qualifications”
who is “smart, thoughtful,” “even-tempered,” and “believes in the rule of law”
and the “independence of the judiciary.”68 Nevertheless, his TRO in
Washington v. Trump elicited a reaction from the President reminiscent of his
remarks about Judge Curiel during the campaign.
Hours after the TRO was issued, President Trump labeled Judge Robart
a “so-called judge” and his order as “ridiculous” and “terrible.”69 He stated
that Judge Robart had “open[ed] up our country to potential terrorists,”70
theorizing that, because of the ruling, “many very bad and dangerous people
may be pouring into our country.”71
Days later, President Trump opined that Judge Robart had “put our
country in . . . peril” and encouraged Americans to “blame him [i.e., Judge

66
67
TIMES

Cohen v. Trump, No. 13-CV-2519, 2016 WL 3036302, at *6 (S.D. Cal. May 27, 2016).
See Jim Brunner, Trump’s “So-Called Judge” Is a Highly Regarded GOP Appointee, SEATTLE
(Feb. 4, 2017), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/judge-who-stalled-travelban-is-a-highly-regarded-gop-appointee/ [https://perma.cc/9FQW-CRZM] (“The federal judge
who ordered a halt to the Trump administration’s controversial travel ban—derided as a ‘so-called
judge’ by a bitter President Trump—is a Republican appointee whose vast legal credentials and
volunteer work for poor children and refugees prompted unanimous Senate confirmation more than
a decade ago.”).
68 Thomas Fuller, “So-Called” Judge Criticized by Trump Is Known as a Mainstream Republican,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/us/james-robart-judge-trump-banseattle.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/83YW-Z2J6].
69 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 5:12 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/827867311054974976?lang=en [https://perma.cc/966L4QM7]; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 1:44 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/827996357252243456?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw
[https://perma.cc/9LWW-NN2D].
70 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 4:48 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/828042506851934209?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw
[https://perma.cc/PG7W-FXBU].
71 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 1:44 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/827996357252243456?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw
[https://perma.cc/PX55-YGFE].

2017]

[DRAFT] Jurisdiction and Judicial Self-Defense

133

Robart] and [the] court system” if “something happens.”72 “The courts,” said
the President, “are making the job” of protecting the country “very difficult!”73
The critiques did not subside once the case moved to the Ninth Circuit.
During a speech the day after appellate arguments in the case, President
Trump bemoaned that the “courts seem to be so political.”74 He later
proclaimed on Twitter that, if the Government did not prevail in the
litigation, “we can never have the security and safety to which we are entitled.”75
Lawyers, legal commentators, law scholars, and bar associations criticized
the President’s comments as an assault on the judiciary.76 Other judges even
joined the fray,77 including President Trump’s own Supreme Court nominee,
Judge Neil Gorsuch of the Tenth Circuit, who characterized Trump’s remarks
as “disheartening” and “demoralizing.”78

72 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 5, 2017, 12:39 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/828342202174668800?lang=en [https://perma.cc/82LM-83U8].
73 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 5, 2017, 12:42 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/828343072840900610?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw
[https://perma.cc/RJ3M-D7QW].
74 Reena Flores, Trump Defends Travel Ban, Blasts “Political” Courts in Speech to Law
Enforcement, CBS NEWS (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-defends-travel-banblasts-political-courts/ [https://perma.cc/R596-NX2Z].
75 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 8, 2017, 4:03 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/829299566344359936 [https://perma.cc/XT86-E5SP].
76 See, e.g., Aebra Coe, Law Schools, Bar Group Denounce Trump Attacks on Judges, LAW360
(Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.law360.com/sports/articles/891797/law-schools-bar-group-denouncetrump-attacks-on-judges?nl_pk=6ecef533-d128-4094-8a10-3c69f7609106&utm_source=newsletter&utm_
medium=email&utm_campaign=sports [https://perma.cc/GE6T-P3NG] (noting that the International
Bar Association had “called for a halt to Trump’s ‘undermining the U.S. judiciary’”); Martha Minow
& Robert Post, Standing Up for “So-Called” Law, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 10, 2017),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/02/10/standing-for-called-law/VLbDYmrwpdjCn8qs5FPJaK/
story.html [https://perma.cc/9V7R-3GUY] (describing how the Deans of Harvard and Yale Law
Schools asserting “[i]t is time for all who care about this nation to worry when the nation’s most
powerful office is used to intimidate the institutions of law that have maintained American stability
and prosperity since the founding of the Republic”); Corky Siemaszko, Experts: Trump Undermines
Judiciary with Twitter Attack on Judge Robart, NBC NEWS (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/
us-news/experts-trump-undermines-judiciary-twitter-attack-judge-robart-n717626 [https://perma.cc/X6279XAY] (quoting various law professors who were concerned by President Trump’s remarks).
77 See Joe Palazzolo, Judges React to Trump’s Attacks on the Judiciary, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2017),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2017/02/13/judges-react-to-trumps-attacks-on-the-judiciary/ [https://perma.cc/
4UYD-JTMJ] (quoting various federal judges).
78 Abby Phillip, Robert Barnes & Ed O’Keefe, Supreme Court Nominee Gorsuch Says Trump’s
Attacks on Judiciary Are “Demoralizing”, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/supreme-court-nominee-gorsuch-says-trumps-attacks-on-judiciary-are-demoralizing/2017/02/
08/64e03fe2-ee3f-11e6-9662-6eedf1627882_story.html?utm_term=.415d878c4464 [https://perma.cc/H764H2AA].
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C. The Institutional Significance of the Choice to Exercise Jurisdiction
It seems unlikely that the Ninth Circuit panel that decided Washington v.
Trump was impervious to these events, given their high-profile nature.79 The
Ninth Circuit itself relied, at least in part, on the “extraordinary
circumstances of this case” to justify its exercise of jurisdiction.80 Simply put,
judicial decisions are not made in a vacuum. As one law professor recently
hypothesized, the President’s “attacks on the integrity of federal judges” have
“transformed [Washington v. Trump] into an early—and critical—showdown
over the independence of the judiciary.”81 Viewed through this lens, the Ninth
Circuit panel’s choice to reach the merits of the case is itself a demonstration
of judicial authority, bolstered in at least three ways.
First, the opinion comes from a higher court. This obvious feature
ordinarily would be unremarkable. Here, however, a decision rejecting (even
preliminarily) the Immigration Order on the merits carries special weight,
given news reports that the Government had not fully complied with prior
TROs issued by other district judges.82 It is easier to credibly criticize (or less
credibly, disregard) a short order of a single, local district judge as
idiosyncratic, unsound, or politically motivated than a precedential opinion
from a three-judge appellate panel that hears cases from nine states covering
twenty percent of the U.S. population.83
Second, the Ninth Circuit panel’s decision was unanimous, reached by
three judges appointed by the bipartisan coterie of Presidents Jimmy Carter,
George W. Bush, and Barack Obama.84 Unanimity, of course, is often
79 Threats against judges involved in the case have required an increased security presence.
Evan Perez, Shimon Prokupecz & Ariane de Vogue, Threats Against Judges in Immigration Ban Cases
Leads to Increased Security, CNN (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/09/politics/judgesthreatened-immigration-order/ [https://perma.cc/QS93-T8W4].
80 Appellate Decision, 847 F.3d 1151, 1158 (9th Cir. 2017).
81 Jonathan Hafetz, Why the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling on Trump’s Travel Ban EO Is So Important,
BALKINIZATION (Feb. 10, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/02/why-ninth-circuits-ruling-ontrumps.html [https://perma.cc/4QZV-X3NZ].
82 See Isaac Arnsdorf, Trump Officials Slow-Walked Court Orders on Travel Ban, POLITICO (Feb.
3, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/trump-officials-travel-ban-234633 [https://perma.cc/
FLG2-K2US] (“A little over 24 hours after Trump ordered the ban, federal judges in New York,
Massachusetts and Virginia issued emergency rulings blocking parts of it. But at Dulles and other
airports, customs officers refused to change their procedures until their superiors conveyed
instructions from agency lawyers reviewing the court decisions, according to three lawyers familiar
with the situation and a congressional staff member investigating the matter.”).
83 See Carol J. Williams, U.S. Supreme Court Again Rejects Most Decisions by the U.S. 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals, L.A. TIMES (July 18, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/18/local/la-meninth-circuit-scorecard-20110718 [https://perma.cc/XYC9-VAMC] (noting that roughly 20% of the
American population resides within the Ninth Circuit).
84 Sudhin Thanawala & Gene Johnson, A Look at Judges Who Refused to Reinstate Trump’s Travel Ban,
U.S. NEWS (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2017-02-09/spotlight-on3-judges-ruling-on-president-trumps-travel-ban [https://perma.cc/M7NX-LB77].
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regarded as a desirable, legitimizing trait of judicial decisions, particularly in
controversial cases.85 Indeed, the panel’s unanimity may be both in response
to and caused by the President’s statements. Some scholars believe that
attempting to “browbeat” or “intimidate” the courts is “counterproductive,”
because it motivates judges to “circle the wagons” and fight against the
perception that they are “cav[ing] to executive pressure” with an
accommodating ruling.86
Third, the panel issued its ruling anonymously, an option not available to
district judges. Writing per curiam somewhat insulates individual appellate
judges from direct, personal attacks on their integrity like those leveled at
Judge Curiel and Judge Robart, both district court judges sitting alone. By
not attributing authorship to one particular judge, the panel hindered an
interlocutor’s ability to target that judge as illegitimate or biased. And aside
from this inoculating effect, anonymity frames the debate in institutional
terms (turf on which courts are more familiar and comfortable) rather than
personal ones, as is more common for disputes within and between the
political branches.87

85 Perhaps the most famous example is Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See
also Neil S. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation in the Federal Courts System, 70 VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (“Proceeding incrementally and finding strength in numbers is one good way
for judges to rebut the President’s repeated charges to his millions of Twitter followers that the
federal courts are illegitimate because all of the judicial decisions going against him are political.”);
Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 770
(2015) (quoting Chief Justice Roberts as stating that “[u]nanimous, or nearly unanimous, decisions
are hard to overturn and contribute to the stability of the law and the continuity of the Court”);
Mark Sherman, Roberts Touts Unanimity on Supreme Court, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/17/AR2006111700999.html [https://
perma.cc/93SA-JGWV] (quoting Chief Justice Roberts as stating that “[t]he more cautious approach,
the approach that can get the most justices to sign onto it, is the preferred approach . . . . It also
contributes, I think, to stability in the law.”).
86 Jack Goldsmith, Does Trump Want to Lose the EO Battle in Court? Or is Donald McGahn
Simply Ineffectual (or Worse)?, LAWFARE (Feb. 6, 2017, 8:22 AM), https://lawfareblog.com/doestrump-want-lose-eo-battle-court-or-donald-mcgahn-simply-ineffectual-or-worse [https://perma.cc/
223L-YCXZ]; Siemaszko, supra note 76 (quoting Professor Ron Allen).
87 As an example of how writing per curiam framed the debate in institutional terms, shortly
after the Ninth Circuit’s decision, President Trump proclaimed “SEE YOU IN COURT.” Donald
J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 9, 2017, 3:35 PM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/829836231802515457 [https://perma.cc/ASJ9-SKDY]. However, his previous
attacks on judicial decisions had largely focused on individual judges, as discussed. See Kat Greene,
Trump Slams 9th Circ. as Court in “Chaos,” “Turmoil”, LAW360 (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.law360.com/
appellate/articles/893204/trump-slams-9th-circ-as-court-in-chaos-turmoil-?nl_pk=f90418ad-8c654126-acc7-9e38c5012dd1&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=appellate
[https://perma.cc/ZG4V-LLS3] (reporting President’s statements about Ninth Circuit’s reversal rate
before Supreme Court); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 6, 2017, 6:49 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/828797801630937089 [https://perma.cc/5993-JYBS] (urging,
the day before Ninth Circuit oral argument, that the “[c]ourts must act fast”).
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CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit panel’s method of resolving the emergency motion for
a stay pending appeal in Washington v. Trump reflects what was likely a
conscious choice to venture into the merits of a highly publicized (and
politicized) case when a jurisdictional avenue would have done the trick. In
fact, President Trump’s statements may have galvanized the court toward that
approach. No one, of course, can know with certainty why the panel decided
to reach the merits, except for the judges themselves. Nevertheless, there is
circumstantial evidence that the Ninth Circuit’s choice to exercise jurisdiction
may have been intended as an institutional display against presidential
challenges to judicial legitimacy. If these concerns did in fact motivate the
panel, then the decision to exercise jurisdiction is a symbol of judicial self-defense,
buttressed by the opinion’s unanimity and anonymity.88

Preferred Citation: S. Cagle Juhan & Greg Rustico, Jurisdiction and
Judicial Self-Defense, 165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2017), http://
www.pennlawreview.com/online/165-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-123.pdf.
88 Indeed, as this Essay goes to press, other Ninth Circuit judges have demonstrated in
forceful terms their willingness to engaged in judicial self-defense. After the President issued an
amended Immigration Order on March 6, 2017, which mooted the Government’s appeal, a judge of
the Ninth Circuit called for a vote on whether to grant en banc rehearing to vacate the panel’s
decision. Washington v. Trump, 2017 WL 992527, at *1 (Mar. 15, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82
Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). A majority of the Ninth Circuit voted against rehearing. 2017 WL
992527, at *1. Judge Stephen Reinhardt concurred in a short opinion, noting that he was “proud to
be a part of this court and a judicial system that is independent and courageous, and that vigorously
protects the constitutional rights of all.” Id. (Reinhardt, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
Although disagreeing with the denial of rehearing, Judge Jay Bybee (joined by Judges Kozinski,
Callahan, Bea, and Ikuta) went even further. Judge Bybee observed that the panel’s decision was
issued “under the worst conditions imaginable, including” compressed timelines “and the most
intense public scrutiny of our court that [he could] remember.” Id. at *10 (Bybee, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc). He continued:

The personal attacks on the distinguished district judge and our colleagues were out of all
bounds of civic and persuasive discourse—particularly when they came from the parties. It
does no credit to the arguments of the parties to impugn the motives or the competence of
the members of this court; ad hominem attacks are not a substitute for effective advocacy.
Such personal attacks treat the court as though it were merely a political forum in which
bargaining, compromise, and even intimidation are acceptable principles. The courts of law
must be more than that, or we are not governed by law at all.
Id. If the panel’s opinion in Washington v. Trump and the atmospherics surrounding the case created
an inference that judicial self-defense was in play, Judge Reinhardt and Judge Bybee’s opinions
strengthen that theory.

